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ABSTRACT
Recently, several new pari-mutuel mechanisms have been in-
troduced to organize markets for contingent claims. Hanson
[7] introduced a market maker derived from the logarith-
mic scoring rule, and later Chen & Pennock [5] developed
a cost function formulation for the market maker. On the
other hand, the SCPM model of Peters et al. [9] is based on
ideas from a call auction setting using a convex optimiza-
tion model. In this work, we develop a unified framework
that bridges these seemingly unrelated models for centrally
organizing contingent claim markets. The framework, de-
veloped as a generalization of the SCPM, will support many
desirable properties such as proper scoring, truthful bidding
(in a myopic sense), efficient computation, and guarantees
on worst case loss. In fact, our unified framework will al-
low us to express various proper scoring rules, existing or
new, from classical utility functions in a convex optimization
problem representing the market organizer. Additionally, we
utilize concepts from duality to show that the market model
is equivalent to a risk minimization problem where a convex
risk measure is employed. This will allow us to more clearly
understand the differences in the risk attitudes adopted by
various mechanisms, and particularly deepen our intuition
about popular mechanisms like Hanson’s market-maker. In
aggregate, we believe this work advances our understanding
of the objectives that the market organizer is optimizing in
popular pari-mutuel mechanisms by recasting them into one
unified framework.
1. INTRODUCTION
Contingent claim markets are organized for a variety of
purposes. Prediction markets are created to aggregate in-
formation about a particular event. Financial markets in-
volving contingent claims allow traders to hedge their ex-
posure to certain event outcomes. Betting markets are de-
signed for entertainment purposes. The participants in these
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markets trade securities which will pay a fixed amount if a
certain event occurs. Some examples of these events would
be the winner of the World Series, the value of the latest
consumer price index or the release date of Windows Vista.
Prediction markets have grown in popularity as research into
the accuracy of their predictions has shown that they effec-
tively aggregate information from the trading population.
One of the longest-running prediction markets is the Iowa
Electronic Market which allows real money betting on var-
ious elections. Studies by Berg and her coauthors (see [2],
[3] and [4]) have shown that the information generated by
these markets often serves as a better prediction of actual
outcomes than polling data. Google has run internal pre-
diction markets over a variety of events and Cowgill et al.
[6] have shown that their predictions also perform quite well.
Despite the potential value created by these markets, there
can be some difficulties with their introduction and devel-
opment. First, many nascent markets suffer from liquidity
problems. Occasionally these problems stem from the choice
of mechanism used to operate the market. Organizing mar-
kets as a continuous double auction (like the NASDAQ stock
market) is a popular option and usually performs well. How-
ever, in thin markets, Bossaerts et al. [1] have demonstrated
that some problems surface which inhibit the growth of liq-
uidity. To overcome this situation, the market organizer
could introduce an automated market-maker which will cen-
trally interact with the traders. This mechanism will have
some rules for pricing shares. The market organizer must
determine these rules with one key question being his own
tolerance for risk. Recently, there has been a surge in re-
search of these automated market-makers.
New market-making mechanisms based on pari-mutuel prin-
ciples have recently been developed by Hanson [7], Pennock
et al. [8] and Peters et al. [9]. These market-makers al-
low contingent claims in nascent market to be immediately
priced according to rules of the mechanism. The mechanisms
are pari-mutuel in the sense that the winners are generally
paid out by the stakes of the losers. The claims being traded
are commitments to pay out a fixed amount if a particular
event occurs in the future. The mechanism developed by
Hanson has been shown to perform well in simulated mar-
kets [10] and has been adopted by many online prediction
markets.
et al. [9] developed their mechanism by creating a sequential
version of a call auction problem which is solved by convex
optimization. Their Sequential Convex Pari-mutuel Mech-
anism (SCPM) uses an optimization problem to determine
when to accept orders and how to price accepted orders. On
the other hand, Hanson’s mechanism is derived from scor-
ing rules. Scoring rules are functions often used to compare
distributions. In particular, Hanson uses the logarithmic
scoring rule to determine how much to charge a trader for a
new order. His mechanism is called the Logarithmic Market
Scoring Rule (LMSR). Using a similar approach as Han-
son, it is possible to create market-makers for other scoring
rules. In contrast to the SCPM, the MSR model doesn’t
directly provide an optimization problem from the market
organizer’s standpoint.
Recently, there has been some interest in comparing and
unifying these mechanisms for prediction markets. Chen
and Pennock [5] give an equivalent cost function based for-
mulation for the MSR market makers, and relate them to
utility-based market makers. They show that a certain class
(hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) of utility-based market
is equivalent to a market scoring rule market maker. Peters
et al. [10] empirically compare the performances of various
market mechanisms. In this work, we provide strong theo-
retical foundation for unifying existing market makers like
the SCPM, the MSR and cost function based markets un-
der a single convex optimization framework. Our model not
only aids in comparing various mechanisms, but also pro-
vides intuitive understanding of the behavior of the market
organizer in these seemingly different mechanisms. Specifi-
cally, our main contributions are as follows:
• The unifying framework: we propose a generalized ver-
sion of the SCPM as a unified convex optimization
framework for market makers. The new model en-
joys many desirable properties like a truthful pricing
scheme, efficient cost function formulation, scoring proper-
ness, and guarantees on worst case loss bounds.
• Equivalence to the MSR market makers: we establish
our claim that the new SCPM framework unifies ex-
isting market makers by showing that a) any market
maker based on a proper scoring rule (MSR) can be
formulated as a special case of this SCPM model; and
conversely, b) an objective function in our framework
implicitly corresponds to a (strictly) proper scoring
rule under certain easily verifiable conditions.
• Intuitive interpretation of the market mechanisms: We
show that the market maker’s model in the new frame-
work is equivalent to convex risk minimization for the
market maker. Thus, when using this model to accept
incoming orders the market maker is actually taking
rational decisions with respect to a risk attitude as de-
fined by the choice of utilities of the framework. Fur-
ther, we show that for some popular mechanisms like
the LMSR, the implicit risk function turns out to char-
acterize precisely how much the market maker is pre-
pared to invest in order to learn a distribution ~p which
is very different from his prior belief. This explains the
design choices of these mechanisms.
• New mechanisms: We take a step forward and demon-
strate with examples that various insights provided by
the unified framework can be used to guide the de-
sign of new mechanisms that have desirable properties
with respect to various criteria discussed: truthfulness,
worst case loss, computational efficiency, risk attitude,
properness of the corresponding scoring rule, etc.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. To begin,
Section 2 will provide some background on the mechanisms
which we will be studying. In Section 3, we propose our
new framework based on a generalization of the SCPM, and
demonstrate its properties of truthful pricing scheme, cost
function based formulation, and guarantees on worst case
loss bounds. In Section 4, we show that the SCPM frame-
work is equivalent to the MSR market makers. Section 5 will
further explain how the market organizer’s decision problem
in our unified framework is actually equivalent to a convex
risk minimization problem. We conclude the paper with a
discussion in Section 6 where we compare the existing mech-
anisms, and provide examples illustrating simple guidelines
for designing new ones.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will provide some background on the
key mechanisms for prediction markets discussed in this
work – the market scoring rule mechanisms (MSR), cost-
function formulation of markets, and the Sequential Convex
Pari-mutuel mechanism (SCPM).
Let ω represent a discrete or discretized random event
to be predicted, with N mutually exclusive and exhaustive
outcomes. We consider a contingent claims market where
claims are of the form “Pays $1 if the outcome state is i”.
A new trader arrives and submits an order which essentially
specifies the claims over each outcome state that the trader
desires to buy. The market maker then decides what price
to charge for the new order. Various mechanisms treat a
new order in the following seemingly different manners:
2.1 Market Scoring Rules
Let ~r = (r1, r2, ..., rN) represents a probability estimate
for the random event ω. A scoring rule is a sequence of scor-
ing functions, S = S1(~r),S2(~r), ...,SN (~r), such that a score
Si(~r) is assigned to ~r if outcome i of the random variable ω
is realized. A proper scoring rule [16] is a scoring rule that
motivates truthful reporting. Based on proper scoring rules,
Hanson[7] developed a Market Scoring Rule(MSR) mecha-
nism. In the MSR market, the market maker with a proper
scoring rule S begins by setting an initial probability esti-
mate, ~r0. Every trader can change the current probability
estimate to a new estimate of his choice as long as he agrees
to pay the market maker the scoring rule payment associ-
ated with the current probability estimate and receive the
scoring rule payment associated with the new estimate.
Some examples of market scoring rules are the logarithmic
market scoring rule (LMSR)[7]:
Si(~r) = b log(ri) (b > 0)
and the quadratic scoring rule:
Si(~r) = 2bri − b
X
j
r2j (b > 0)
Hanson’s MSR has many favorable characteristics. It is de-
signed as a pari-mutuel mechanism which bounds the risk of
the market organizer. It functions as an automated market
maker in the sense that it is always able to calculate prices
for new orders. Crucially, the LMSR is also known to elicit
truthful bids from the market traders.
2.2 Cost function of Market-makers
Recently, Chen & Pennock [5] proposed a cost function
based implementation of market makers. Let the vector
~q ∈ RN represents the number of claims on each state cur-
rently held by the traders. In the cost function formulation,
the total cost of all the orders ~q is calculated via some cost
function C(~q). A trader submits an order characterized by
the vector ~a ∈ RN where ai reflects the number of claims
over state i that the trader desires. The market organizer
will charge the new trader C(~q+~a)−C(~q) for his order. At
any time in the market, the going price of a claim for state
i, pi(~q), equals ∂C/∂qi. The price is the cost per share for
purchasing an infinitesimal quantity of security i.
Chen & Pennock [5] show that any scoring rule has an equiv-
alent cost function formulation. For example, below are the
specific cost and pricing functions for LMSR:
C(~q) = b log
“P
j e
qj/b
”
and pi(~q) =
eqi/b
P
j e
qj/b
For general market scoring rules, they proposed three equa-
tions that the cost function C should satisfy so that the cost
function based market maker is equivalent to the market
based on a given scoring rule S :
Si(~p) = qi − C(~q) +K ∀iP
i pi = 1
pi =
∂C
∂qi
∀i
(1)
We will use this formulation later to prove equivalence of
MSR and SCPM mechanisms.
2.3 Sequential Convex Pari-Mutuel Mechanism
The SCPM was designed to require traders to submit or-
ders which include three elements: a limit price (π), a limit
quantity (l) and a vector (~a) that represents which states
the order should contain. The components of the vector ~a
will contain either a 1 (if a claim over the specified state is
desired) or a 0 (if it is not desired). The limit price refers to
the maximum amount that the trader wishes to pay for one
share. The limit quantity represents the maximum number
of shares that the trader is willing to buy. The market maker
decides the actual number of shares x to be granted to a new
order, and the price to be charged for the order. The market
maker solves the following optimization problem for making
this decision:
maximizex,z,~s πx− z +
P
i θi log(si)
subject to ~ax+ ~s+ ~q = z~e
0 ≤ x ≤ l,
(2)
where parameters ~q stands for the numbers of shares cur-
rently held by the traders prior to the new order (π, l,~a)
arrives, and ~e represents the vector of all 1s. Each time a
new order arrives, the optimization problem (2) is solved
and the state prices are defined to be the optimal dual vari-
ables corresponding to the first set of constraints denoted as
~p. The trader is then charged according to the inner product
of the final price and the order filled (~pT~a).
This optimization problem, without the utility functionP
i θi log si, has the following interpretation for the market
maker: besides x, decision variable z represents the maxi-
mum number of accumulated shares, including ~s represent-
ing the contingent numbers of surplus shares would be kept
by the market maker, over all states; and (πx − z) in the
objective represents the profit that would be made from the
new order. Thus, market organizer aims at maximizing his
worst case profit. As we establish later in this paper, adding
the utility function
P
i θi log(si) enhances the risk taking
ability of the market maker.
3. THE UNIFYING FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we illustrate that a generalized formula-
tion of SCPM provides a unifying framework for pari-mutuel
market mechanisms. We propose the following convex op-
timization model with a concave continuous utility function
u(~s) 1:
maximizex,z,~s πx− z + u(~s)
subject to ~ax+ ~s+ ~q = z~e
0 ≤ x ≤ l
(3)
Note that utility function u(~s) =
P
i θi log si used in the
original SCPM model of Peters et al. [10] is a special case
of (3). From here on, “SCPM” refers to the above gener-
alized SCPM model. When required, we disambiguate by
referring to the original model with u(~s) =
P
i θi log si as
“Log-SCPM”. The optimization model (3) has exactly the
same meaning for the market maker as the Log-SCPM, and
inherits many desirable properties like intuitive interpreta-
tion, convex formulation, global optimality, Lagrange du-
ality, polynomial computational complexity, etc., as in the
original Log-SCPM model. Next, we demonstrate some new
desirable properties of the new SCPM framework including
truthfulness of the pricing scheme, efficient cost function
based scoring rules, and easily computable guarantees on
worst case loss.
3.1 Truthful pricing scheme
The original SCPM model does not provide incentives
for the traders to bid truthfully [10]. On the other hand,
market scoring rules such as LMSR ensure truthful bidding.
We show that this difference in incentives is attributed to a
difference between the implementation of SCPM and MSR
pricing scheme. In the SCPM model, the market organizer
will typically charge the trader for an accepted number of
shares based on the final price calculated by the mechanism.
However, in the market scoring rules such as LMSR, the
trader is actually charged by a cost function which is equiv-
alent to the integral of the pricing function over the number
of shares accepted. Thus, as the price increases while the or-
der is filled, the trader is charged the instantaneous price for
each infinitesimally small portion of his order that is filled.
We show that our general SCPM framework equally ad-
mits truthfulness if the market maker charge traders accord-
ing to the integral of the price function over infinitesimally
small accepted shares. More specifically, the new charging
scheme solves the optimization problem for infinitesimally
1Indeed, there is another technical condition on u(·) that
is required for this model to be feasible and bounded, that
is, ∀~q ≥ 0, ∃t, ∇u(t~e − ~q)T~e = 1, where ∇u(·) denotes the
(sub-)gradient function.
small orders, thus computing incremental prices. Define
~p(ǫ) to be the dual prices corresponding to the following
optimization problem (with l = ǫ):
maximizex,z,~s πx− z + u(~s)
subject to ~ax+ ~s+ ~q = z~e
0 ≤ x ≤ ǫ
(4)
The SCPM model (3) can be equivalently viewed as gradu-
ally increasing ǫ until the price become more than the bid
offered, or the trader reaches his limit l. Let x¯ be the optimal
solution to (3), i.e. the largest ǫ such that the last constraint
in (4) is tight at optimality. Now, instead of charging the
trader the final price ~p(x¯)T~a as in the conventional SCPM,
we charge an accepted order by the following formula:
(
R x¯
0
~p(ǫ)dǫ)T~a (5)
Below, we establish the integrability of the pricing func-
tion and some important properties of the new pricing mech-
anism:
Lemma 3.1. 1. The price vector sums up to 1 for every
ǫ;
2. The price is non-negative if the utility function u(·) is
non-decreasing;
3. The price is consistent, i.e., the market organizer will
accept another infinitesimal order if π is greater than
the instantaneous price of the order and vice versa;
4. The instantaneous price ~p(ǫ)T~a is non-decreasing in ǫ;
5. The price function is integrable.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is provided in Ap-
pendix A.1.
The above properties of the pricing scheme lead to the fol-
lowing strong result about the truthfulness of this scheme:
Theorem 3.2. Irrespective of the choice of utility func-
tion u(·), the optimal bidding strategy in the SCPM is my-
opically truthful when the traders are charged according to
pricing scheme (5).
Proof. Assume that the trader has a valuation of γ for
his desired order ~a with a quantity limit of l. The trader’s
profit can be expressed as: R(x) = γx− (
R x
0
~p(ǫ)dǫ)T~a. The
trader seeks to maximize R by choosing a proper π. From
the previous lemma, we know that ~p(ǫ)T~a is non-decreasing
in ǫ. Thus, it is easy to see that an optimal strategy when
~p(0)T~a ≥ γ is to not place an order. Thus, we will assume
that ~p(0)T~a < γ.
Also, since p(x) is non-decreasing in x, R(x) is a concave
function in x. Therefore, the optimal x ≤ l (that maximizes
trader’s profit R(x)) is given by the following optimality
conditions
(x− l)
`
γ − ~p(x)T~a
´
= 0
γ ≥ ~p(x)T~a
On the other hand, the market organizer will accept a bid
if and only if ~p(ǫ)T~a is less than π. Hence, setting π = γ
gives the optimal x, and thus optimal profit for the trader.
This is equivalent to bidding truthfully since the trader will
essentially bid such that the instantaneous price is driven
either to their valuation or as close to their valuation as
possible before hitting the limit quantity constraint.
Therefore, we have shown that the truthfulness of this
mechanism does not depend on the particular choice of util-
ity function but rather on the implementation of the charg-
ing method. By revising the charging method to an ‘incre-
mental’ one, we can create a truthful implementation for the
general SCPM. As we show in the next section, the integral
in the expression (5) does not need to be explicitly calculated
in order to compute it; given x¯, we can compute the total
charge efficiently using a convex cost function formulation.
3.2 Cost function of the market maker
Section 2.2 discussed a cost function based implementa-
tion for market makers, introduced by Chen and Pennock
[5]. In this section, we derive a convex cost function for
the SCPM, which will reduce the problem of computing the
integral (5) to a simple convex optimization problem.
Theorem 3.3. Let ~q be the number of shares on each
state held by the traders in the SCPM market, and a new
order (π, l,~a) is accepted up to level x¯ and is charged ac-
cording to pricing scheme (5). Then, the charge is„Z x¯
0
~p(ǫ)dǫ
«T
~a = C(~q + ~ax¯)− C(~q),
where C(~q) is a convex cost function defined by
C(~q) = min
t
t− u(te− ~q), (6)
and has the property ~eT∇C(~q) = 1, ∀~q ≥ 0.
Proof. Note that ~p(ǫ) is the optimal dual solution asso-
ciated with the optimization problem:
maximize
z,~s
πǫ− z + u(~s)
s.t. ~aǫ + ~s+ ~q = z~e.
Let V (~q, ǫ) denote the optimal objective value of the above
problem. Then,
V (~q, ǫ) =
maxz,~s πǫ− z + u(~s)
s.t. ~aǫ+ ~q + ~s = z~e
= πǫ−min
z
n
z − u(z~e− ~q − ~aǫ)
o
= πǫ− C(~q + ~aǫ)
Next, using local sensitivity analysis results (e.g., discussed
in [15]), the optimal dual variables ~p(ǫ)
p(ǫ)i = −
∂V (~q, ǫ)
∂qi
=
∂C(~q + ~aǫ)
∂qi
Thus, we can conclude the statement presented in our the-
orem by performing the integrationZ x¯
0
~p(ǫ)T~adǫ =
Z x¯
0
∇qC(~q + ~aǫ)
T~adǫ
=
Z x¯
0
dC(~q + ~aǫ)
dǫ
dǫ
= C(~q + ~ax¯)− C(~q)
Finally, we can verify that C(~q) is a convex function of ~q
since it is the minimum over t of a function that is jointly
convex in both t and ~q.
Note that not only is the cost function convex, but it can
also be simply computed for any given ~q by solving a single
variable convex optimization problem. This is in contrast
to the market scoring rules, where computing the cost func-
tion is non-trivial and requires solving a set of differential
equations (refer equation (1) in section 2.2).
3.3 Worst case loss for the market maker
An interesting consequence of the cost function represent-
ing the SCPM developed in the previous section, is that the
worst case loss can be formulated as a convex optimization
problem:
Theorem 3.4. Assuming the market starts with 0 shares
initially, then the worst case loss for the market maker using
the SCPM mechanism is given by B + C(0) where
B = maxi{max~s u(~s)− si}
and C(·) is the cost function defined by (6).
Proof. Let the number of shares held by the traders
at time t is (~q)t. By Theorem 3.3, assuming we started
with 0 shares initially, the total money collected at time t is
C((~q)t)−C(0). On the other hand, if state scenario i occurs,
the market maker needs to pay amount (qi)
t, Thus, we can
find for each state scenario i, the worst case loss by solving
the optimization problem :
max
~q≥0
qi − (C(~q)− C(0)) = max
t,~q≥0
{(qi − t) + u(t~e− ~q)}+C(0)
= max
~s
{u(~s)− si}+ C(0).
Then, we take the maximum among all scenarios to conclude
the proof.
As a corollary of the above theorem, we have that:
Corollary 3.5. Computing the worst case loss bound
for the SCPM is a convex optimization problem. Further-
more, a necessary and sufficient condition on utility func-
tion u(·) in order to guarantee a bounded loss is that the
difference u(~s)− si is bounded from above.
Below, we illustrate the application of the above theorem
through some examples. Detailed proofs for these examples
are available in Appendix D.
Example 3.6. For u(~s) = −b log
`P
i exp(−si/b)
´
, we
can compute B = 0, C(0) = b logN , giving worst case loss
as b logN .
Example 3.7. For u(~s) = ~e
T~s
N
− 1
4b
~sT (I − ~e~e
T
N
)~s, we can
derive B = b(1− 1
N
), C(0) = 0 giving bound (N−1)b
N
.
Later in Section 4, we demonstrate that the above two choices
of utility functions are equivalent to the LMSR and the
Quadratic market scoring rules respectively. Observe that
the derived bounds match those known in the literature for
these scoring rules [5].
Example 3.8. For the Log-SCPM, u(~s) =
P
i θi log(si),
we can show that B is unbounded by using s1 = 1, si = α,
and letting α→∞.
B ≥ lim
α→∞
θ1 log 1 +
X
i6=1
θi log(α)− 1 =∞
and C(0) =
P
i θi −
P
i θi log
P
i θi. Thus, the worst case
loss is unbounded in this case.
Example 3.9. For u(~s) = mini si , the worst case loss
is 0; since for all values of (~s, t): u(~s) ≤ si and t = u(t~e).
Observe that here the utility of the surplus profit ~s is equal to
the minimum or “worst case” profit. This represents extreme
risk averseness of the market organizer.
The last example provided a glimpse of how the utility func-
tion relates to the risk averseness of the market maker. In
Section 5, we will further build this intuition for the behav-
ior of the organizer by recasting our optimization framework
as a risk minimization problem.
4. RELATIONSHIP OF THE SCPM AND THE
MSR
The Market scoring rules (MSR) form a large class of pop-
ular pari-mutuel mechanisms. In this section, we demon-
strate a strong equivalence between the SCPM and the MSR
markets. Particularly, we show that:
Theorem 4.1. Any proper market scoring rule with cost
function C(·) of (1) can be formulated as an SCPM model
(3) with the ‘concave’ utility function u(~s) = −C(−~s), and
the two models are equivalent in terms of the orders accepted
and the price charged for a submitted order.
Theorem 4.2. The SCPM with any utility function u(·)
gives an implicit proper scoring rule, as long as the utility
function has the property that its derivative spans the sim-
plex {~r : ~eT~r = 1, ~r ≥ 0}, that is, for all vectors ~r in the
simplex:
∇u(~s) = ~r, ∃ ~s. (7)
Thus, the SCPM framework subsumes the class of proper
scoring rule mechanisms. Moreover, a proper scoring rule
based market can be created by simply choosing a utility
function u(·) that satisfies condition (7). As we shall demon-
strate later in this section, this condition is not difficult to
satisfy or validate, thus providing a useful tool to design
market mechanisms that correspond to a proper scoring rule.
We first prove the above theorems for general MSR based
market, and then illustrate with specific examples of the
LMSR and the Quadratic market scoring rules.
4.1 Equivalent SCPM for MSR (Theorem 4.1)
To establish Theorem 4.1, we use the cost function for-
mulation of market scoring rules discussed in [5], and briefly
explained in Section 2.2. We first establish the following im-
portant properties of the cost function for any proper scoring
rule:
Lemma 4.3. The cost function C(·) for any proper scor-
ing rule has following properties:
1. C(~q) is a convex function of ~q
2. For any vector ~q and scalar d, it holds that: C(~q+d~e) =
d+ C(~q)
Proof. The proof is referred to Appendix B. Note that
in [5], the second property above was treated as an assump-
tion based on the principle of no arbitrage. Here, we show
that it can actually be derived from the properties of cost
function formulation itself.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1:
Proof. Using the result in part 1 of Lemma 4.3, clearly
the proposed utility function u(~s) = −C(−~s) is concave.
In light of part 2 of Lemma 4.3, we have C(−~s + z~e) =
C(−~s) + z. Therefore, the proposed utility function u(~s) =
−C(−~s) = z−C(z~e−~s). Incorporating u(~s) = z−C(z~e−~s)
in the SCPM model (3), we get the following optimization
problem:
maximizex,z,~s πx− C(z~e− ~s)
subject to z~e− ~ax− ~s = ~q
0 ≤ x ≤ l
Since, C(·) was proven to be convex in part 1 of Lemma 4.3,
this is a convex optimization problem with KKT conditions:
~pT~a+ y ≥ π, x · (~pT~a+ y − π) = 0,
pi =
∂C(~q+~ax)
∂qi
, y · (l − x) = 0, y ≥ 0, 0 ≤ x ≤ l.
Thus, x is increased until x = l, or the price ~pT~a = ∇C(~q+
~ax)T~a becomes greater than the bid price π. In particu-
lar, under continuous charging scheme, where a series of
optimization problems are solved with small l = ǫ, this
corresponds to charging the increasing instantaneous price
~p(ǫ)T~a = ∇C(~q +~aǫ)T~a until it is greater than the price of-
fered by the bidder. For infinitesimally small ǫ, limǫ→0p(ǫ)i =
∂C
∂qi
. Thus, the orders accepted and price charged become
equivalent to the market scoring rule with cost function
C(~q).
4.2 Properness of the SCPM (Theorem 4.2)
In this section, we prove that the SCPM mechanism is
proper, that is, it implicitly corresponds to scoring the re-
ported beliefs with a proper scoring rule, as long as the util-
ity function satisfies the spanning condition (7).
Proof. By definition, a scoring rule S(·) is proper if and
only if given any outcome distribution ~r, an optimal strategy
of a selfish trader is to report belief ~r, that is:
~p∗ ∈ argmax~p
P
i riSi(~p) = ~r
In cost function based markets like the SCPM, the traders
do not directly report a belief ~p. Instead, they buy shares ~q
paying a price that equals to the difference of the cost func-
tion, and thus indirectly reporting the belief as the resulting
price vector ~p. For these markets, an implicit scoring rule is
defined in the following manner [5]:
Si(~p) = qi −C(~q) +K ∀i
where pi =
∂C
∂qi
∀i
(also refer equation (1) in Section 2.2). Therefore, the proper-
ness condition in terms of ~q is represented as:
~p∗ := ∇C( ~q∗) = ~r (8)
where ~q∗ ∈ argmax~q≥0
P
i ri(qi − C(~q)) (9)
for all distributions ~r.
Intuitively, since the traders receive $1 for each share on
the actual outcome, the profit of traders for outcome state i
is qi − C(~q). Thus, the “properness” condition ensures that
an optimal strategy for selfish traders is to buy orders ~q so
that the resulting price vector is equal to their actual belief.
Now, the optimality conditions for (9) are:
ri −
∂C( ~q∗)
∂q∗i
+ η∗i = 0, η
∗
i ≥ 0, q
∗
i ≥ 0, η
∗
i q
∗
i = 0, ∀i
Thus, condition (8) is satisfied if there exists a positive op-
timal solution to (9). As derived in Theorem 3.3, the cost
function of the SCPM mechanism is given by (6). Therefore,
the optimization problem (9) is equivalent to
max~q≥0
P
i ri(qi −mint{t− u(t~e− ~q)})
⇔ max~q≥0,t
P
i ri(qi − t+ u(t~e− ~q))
⇔ max~q≥0,t ~r
T (~q − t~e) + u(t~e− ~q)
⇔ max~s:~s=t~e−~q,~q≥0 u(~s)− ~r
T~s
⇔ max~s u(~s)− ~r
T~s
As long as there exists an optimal solution ~s∗ to the above
problem, we can set t∗ as a large positive value and set
~q∗ = t∗~e − ~s∗ > 0. Thus, the condition (7), that is, ∇u(~s)
spans the simplex, ensures the properness. It is easy to see
that this is also a necessary condition. This proves Theorem
4.2.
A concern however is that the price vector ~p∗ that max-
imizes trader’s expected profit may not be unique. This
could be either because there are multiple sub-gradients of
the cost function C(~q) at optimal ~q∗ resulting in multiple
price vectors ~p∗, or because there are multiple optimal ~q∗
and they all result in different corresponding price vectors
∇C( ~q∗). This is typically undesirable since in this case, ei-
ther buying the orders ~q∗ associated with the true belief ~r is
not the only optimal strategy for the traders, or even in the
case that the traders acquire ~q∗, the market maker is still
unable to recover the true belief. This situation is avoided
by the concept of strictly proper scoring rules. A scoring
rule is called “strictly proper” if the only optimal strategy
for traders is to honestly report the belief [16]. In terms
of our market mechanism, it means that the optimal price
vector ~p∗ that satisfies condition (8) − (9) must be unique.
Since u(·) is concave, it is easy to see that a sufficient con-
dition to ensure strict properness in the SCPM is that u(·)
is a smooth function, that is, ∇u(·) is continuous (over the
simplex).
Next, we illustrate the equivalence between the SCPM
and proper scoring rules using some popular mechanisms as
examples.
4.3 Examples from existing mechanisms
Example 4.4. The LMSR market maker is equivalent to
the SCPM framework with utility function u(~s) = −C(−~s) =
−b log (
P
i e
−si/b). This scoring rule is known to be strictly
proper [7]. Note that our condition for properness is satisfied
as well since u(·) is smooth and
∇u(~s) =
»
e−si/bP
i e
−si/b
–
which clearly spans the simplex.
Example 4.5. A market maker using Quadratic-Scoring-
Rule is equivalent to the SCPM framework with utility func-
tion u(~s) = −C(−~s) = ~e
T~s
N
− 1
4b
~sT (I − ~e~e
T
N
)~s. This scoring
rule is known to be strictly proper [5]. Our condition for
properness is satisfied since u(·) is smooth and
∇u(~s) =
»
1
N
+
s¯− si
2b
–
where s¯ = ~eT~s/N . Thus, for any ~r in simplex, we can set
si = −2bri to get ∇u(~s) = ~r
Example 4.6. For the Log-SCPM [10], u(~s) =
P
i θi log si,
∇u(~s)i = θi/si, which clearly spans the interior of the sim-
plex for any positive ~θ. Also, u(·) is smooth, thus this mech-
anism is strictly proper.
Example 4.7. For u(~s) = mini si, the set of sub-gradients
at ~s = ~e is the convex hull of orthogonal vectors {~ei}i=1,...,n
where ~ei denotes a vector with 1 at position i and 0 else-
where. This convex hull is exactly the simplex. Thus, the
scoring rule in the SCPM with this utility is proper but not
strictly proper.
Example 4.8. Consider a linear utility function u(~s) =
~cT~s. This mechanism is not proper, since the derivative of
the function is a constant vector, and does not span the sim-
plex.
So far, we established the SCPM as a general market mecha-
nism that includes all scoring rules which are proper and pos-
sess common desired properties. A natural question would
be: what is the difference among the different utility objec-
tive functions adopted in the SCPM? Next, we will show
that they represent different risk measures for the market
maker. Thus, when using this model to accept incoming or-
ders the market maker is actually taking rational decisions
with respect to a specific risk attitude defined in terms of
u(·).
5. RISKS FOR THE MARKET MAKER
Each time he or she is offered an order, the market maker
must consider the risks involved in accepting it. This is
due to the fact that the monetary return generated from
the market depends on the actual state outcome. In the
earlier pari-mutuel market introduced in [12], this risk was
effectively handled in terms of maximizing the worst case
return generated by the market relative to the set of out-
comes (i.e., u(~s) = mini si, refer Example 3.9). Unfortu-
nately, this risk attitude is somewhat limiting as it will cre-
ate a market which is likely to accept very few orders and
extract little information. In what follows, we consider the
return generated by the market to be a random variable Z
and demonstrate that, when accepting orders based on the
SCPM with a non-decreasing utility function, the market
maker effectively takes rational decisions with respect to a
risk attitude. We use duality theory to gain new insights
about how this attitude relates to the concept of prior belief
about the true probability of outcomes.
5.1 The SCPM Markets and the Convex Risk
Measures
In a finitely discrete probability space (Ω,F), the set of
random variables Z can be described as the set of functions
Z : Ω → ℜ. A convex risk measure on the set Z is defined
as follows:
Definition 5.1. When the random outcome Z represents
a return, a risk measure is a function ρ : Z → ℜ that de-
scribes one’s attitude towards risk as : random return Z is
preferred to Z′ if ρ(Z) ≤ ρ(Z′) . Furthermore, a risk mea-
sure is called convex if it satisfies the following:
• Convexity : ρ(λZ+(1−λ)Z′) ≤ λρ(Z)+(1−λ)ρ(Z′),
∀ Z, Z′ ∈ Z, and ∀ λ ∈ [0, 1]
• Monotonicity : If Z, Z′ ∈ Z and Z ≥ Z′ then ρ(Z) ≤
ρ(Z′)
• Translation Equivariance : If α ∈ ℜ and Z ∈ Z, then
ρ(Z + α) = ρ(Z)− α
Convex risk measures are intuitively appealing. First,
even in a context where the decision maker does not know
the probability of occurrence for the different outcomes, it
is still possible to describe a risk function ρ(Z). The three
properties of convex risk measures are also natural ones to
expect from such a function. Convexity states that diversi-
fying the returns leads to lower risks. Monotonicity states
that if the returns are reduced for all outcomes then the risk
is higher. And finally, translation invariance states that if
a fixed income is added to random returns then it is irrele-
vant wether this fixed income is received before or after the
random return is realized. We refer the reader to [11] for a
deeper study of convex risk measures.
Next, we formulate the SCPM model for prediction mar-
kets as a convex risk minimization problem. In context of
prediction markets, the random return Z will represent the
revenue for the market organizer, which depends on the ac-
tual outcome of the random event in question. Let ~q repre-
sent the total orders held by the traders, and c represent the
total money collected so far from the traders in the market.
Since the market organizer has to pay $1 for each accepted
order that matches the outcome, his revenue for outcome
state i is c− qi. When a new trader enters with a bid of π,
based on the number of accepted orders x, the total revenue
for state i is given by (c−qi+πx−aix). The risk minimiza-
tion model seeks to choose the number of accepted orders x
to minimize the risk on total revenue. Below, we formally
show that the SCPM model is equivalent to a convex risk
minimization model.
Theorem 5.2. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ..., ωm}, ~Z ∈ ℜ
m be the
vector representation of Z such that ~Zi = Z(ωi), and Z
x(ωi) =
c − qi + πx − aix. Then, given that u(·) is non-decreasing,
the SCPM optimization model (3) is equivalent in terms of
set of optimal solutions for x to the risk minimization model
minimize
x
ρ(Zx)
s.t. 0 ≤ x ≤ l
with convex risk measure ρ(Z) = mint{t− u(~Z + t~e)}.
Proof. The equivalence can be obtained by first elim-
inating ~s in (3), and then performing a simple change of
variable t = z − πx− c:
maxz πx− z + u (z~e− ~ax− ~q)
= maxt−t+ u (t~e+ (πx+ c)~e− ~ax− ~q)− c
= −mint{t− u
“
~Zx + t~e
”
} − c
= −ρ(Zx)− c .
Since maximizing −ρ(Zx)−c over x is equivalent to minimiz-
ing ρ(Zx) in terms of optimal solution set, the equivalence
follows directly.
It remains to show that, when u(·) is concave and non-
decreasing, the proposed measure satisfies the three prop-
erties (convexity, monotonicity, and translational equivari-
ance) of a convex risk measure. The convexity and the
monotonicity follow directly from concavity and monotonic-
ity of u(·). We refer the reader to Appendix C for more
details on this part of the proof.
Remark 5.3. More importantly, Theorem 5.2 essentially
shows that any convex risk measure ρ(Z) can potentially be
used to create a version of the SCPM market which accepts
orders according the risk attitude described by ρ(Z). This
is achieved by simply choosing the utility function u(~s) =
−ρ(Y ~s) where Y ~s : Ω → ℜ is a random variable defined as
Y ~s(ωi) = si. Such a constructed u(·) is necessarily concave
and increasing.
5.2 Risk attitude through the belief space
We just showed that the SCPM actually represents a risk
minimization problem for the market maker when u(·) is
non-decreasing. In fact, we can get more insights about the
specific risk attitude by studying the dual representation of
risk measure ρ(Z):
ρ(Z) = min
~p∈{~p|~p≥0,
P
i pi=1}
E~p[Z] + L(~p) , (10)
where L(~p) = max~s u(~s) − ~p
T~s, and E~p[Z] =
P
i pi
~Zi. We
refer the reader to [11] for more details on the equivalence of
this representation. Note that ρ(Z) is evaluated by consid-
ering the worst distribution ~p in terms of trading off between
reducing expected return and reducing the penalty function
L(~p).
In terms of the SCPM, this representation equivalence
leads to the conclusion that orders are accepted according
to:
max
0≤x≤l
 
min
~p∈{~p|~p≥0,
P
i pi=1}
X
i
pi ~Z
x
i + L(~p)
!
. (11)
In this form, it becomes clearer how L(~p) encodes the intents
of the market maker and relates it to his belief about the
true distribution of outcomes. For instance, we know that
the first order is accepted only if
∀ ~p ∈ {~p |~p ≥ 0,
X
i
pi = 1},
X
i
pi ~Z
x
i ≥ −(L(~p)− L(pˆ)) ,
where pˆ = argmin~p∈{~p|~p≥0,
P
i pi=1}
L(~p). For any given ~p,
the penalty L(~p)−L(pˆ) therefore reflects how much the mar-
ket maker is willing to lose in terms of expected returns in
the case that the true distribution of outcomes ends up be-
ing ~p. It is also the case that after accepting ~q orders, the
distribution described by ~p∗ = argmin~p ~p
T (c~e− ~q) + L(~p) is
actually the vector of dual prices computed in the SCPM. In
other words, the price vector in the SCPM market reflects
the distribution that is being considered as the outcome dis-
tribution by the market organizer in order to determine his
expected return. This confirms the interpretation of prices
as a belief consensus on outcome distribution generated from
the market.
As we will see next, the function L(~p) will typically be
chosen so that L(~p) − L(pˆ) is large if ~p is far from pˆ, and
pˆ will reflect a prior belief of the market organizer. That
is, the market organizer is willing to lose on the expected
return in order to learn a distribution ~p that is very different
from his prior belief. This is in accordance with the fact
that the market is being organized as a prediction market
rather than a pure financial market, and one of the goals of
market organizer is to learn beliefs even if at some risk to
the generated returns.
We make the above interpretations clearer through the
following examples.
Example 5.4. The utility function u(~s) = mini{si} cor-
responds to cost L(~p) = mini{si} − ~p
T~s = 0 for all ~p. That
is, the market organizer is purely maximizing his worst case
return.
Example 5.5. For the LMSR, u(~s) = −b log
P
i exp (−si/b),
which is equivalent to using L(~p) as the Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence of ~p from uniform distribution LKL(~p ; U). This
is minimized at pˆ = U reflecting a uniform prior. The cor-
responding risk measure is also known as the Entropic Risk
Measure and its level of tolerance is measured by b.
Example 5.6. The Log-SCPM uses u(~s) =
P
i θi log(si),
which is equivalent to choosing the penalty function to be
the negative log-likelihood of ~p being the true distribution
given a set of observations described by the vector ~θ. More
specifically, LLL(~p ;
~θ) = − log
“Q
i p
θi
i
”
+K, which is mini-
mized at pˆi =
θiP
i θi
and tolerance to risk is measured throughP
i θi.
These examples illustrate how the risk minimization rep-
resentation provides insights on how to choose u(·). In the
case of the Min-SCPM (Example 5.4), the associated penalty
function leads to a market where trades that might generate
a loss for the market maker are necessarily rejected. Hence,
the traders have no incentive for sharing their belief. On the
other hand, both the LMSR and the Log-SCPM are mech-
anism that will accept orders leading to negative expected
returns under a distribution ~p, as long as this distribution is
“far enough” from pˆ. Effectively, a trader with a belief that
differs from pˆ will have his order accepted given that he
submits it early enough. In practice, choosing between the
LMSR and the Log-SCPM involves determining whether the
Kullback−Leibler divergence or a likelihood measure better
characterizes the market maker’s commitment to learning
the true distribution.
6. DISCUSSION
In this work, we introduced a unified convex optimiza-
tion framework for constructing prediction market mecha-
nisms. We first showed that in this new framework, the
pricing mechanism always allows truthful bidding (in a my-
opic sense) to be an attitude that is optimal for the traders.
Also, the pricing mechanism always leads to prices that can
be computed efficiently using a convenient convex cost func-
tion formulation. We showed how the original SCPM mech-
anism and mechanisms that are based on scoring rules could
be cast in this unifying framework. These mechanisms actu-
ally differ only in terms of the choice of utility function. This
fact led to the analysis of properties of this utility function
which are of particular interest when designing a prediction
market. We first proposed a way to compute the potential
worst case loss obtained from the market in this framework.
We also discussed conditions on the utility function to en-
sure ‘properness’ of the mechanism inline with the definition
of a proper scoring rule. Later, we showed that when select-
ing a non-decreasing utility function, the market maker is
implicitly defining his risk attitude with respect to the po-
tential revenues obtained from the market.
Table 1: A summary of properties of various market mechanisms
u(~s) Truthful
Worst
Cost
Convex
Risk Measure
L(~p) Properness
LMSR −b log(
P
i exp(−
si
b
)) Yes b logN Yes bLKL(~p||U) Strictly Proper
Log-SCPM b
P
i log(si) Yes ∞ Yes bLLL(~p||U) Strictly Proper
Min-SCPM mini si Yes 0 Yes 0 Proper
Quad. Scoring Rule
1
N
~eT~s− 1
4b
~sT (I − 1
N
~e~eT )~s Yes bN−1
N
No - Strictly Proper
Exponetial-SCPM b(1− 1
N
P
i exp(−
si
b
)) Yes b logN Yes bLKL(~p||U) Strictly Proper
Quad-SCPM max~v≤~s
1
N
~eT~v − 1
4b
~vT~v Yes bN−1
N
Yes b‖~p− U‖22 Strictly Proper
We believe these properties to be very valuable for selecting
the most effective market mechanism in a given application.
Table 1 summarizes the conclusions we derived for a set of
popular mechanisms: the LMSR, the original SCPM (Log-
SCPM), the riskless Market (Min-SCPM), and the market
based on the quadratic scoring rule. The table relates truth-
fulness and properness of the mechanisms to the worst case
loss and the relationship to market maker’s risk attitude.
We believe that these results can provide guidance in de-
signing cost effective prediction markets. The table also
introduces new versions of the SCPM model described in
Example 6.1 and 6.2. These models are valuable since they
extend very naturally the landscape of structures for char-
acterizing the market maker’s risk attitude through the def-
inition of penalty functions L(~p).
Example 6.1. Consider the “Exponential-SCPM”obtained
from using the following utility:
u(~s) = b(1−
1
N
X
i
e−si/b)
This utility function is concave, non-decreasing and separa-
ble. It has a bounded worst case loss equal to b logN . And,
the function L(~p) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of ~p from
uniform distribution LKL(~p ; U). Using the pricing scheme
described in Section 3.1, it leads to a prediction market that
is myopically truthful. Also, the corresponding scoring rule
is strictly proper. And, the orders can be priced using convex
cost function C(~q) = log
P
i
eqi/b
N
.
The above example shows that we can achieve properties
same as the LMSR using an alternative separable utility
function in the SCPM. Our unified analysis of the SCPM
model also allows us to suggest a modification to the pre-
diction market that uses a quadratic scoring rule. Although
this rule is known to be myopically truthful, in practice a
market maker that uses this rule needs to explicitly restrict
prices to be between [0,1] at all times. A solution to this
problem is to use an SCPM market with the following semi-
quadratic non-decreasing utility function:
Example 6.2. Consider the “Quad-SCPM”obtained from
using the following utility:
u(~s) = max
~v≤~s
1
N
~θT~v −
1
4b
~vT~v
for some ~θ such that
P
i θi = 1. This utility function is non-
decreasing and concave which ensures that resulting prices
are non-negative and sum to 1. It has bounded worst case
lost given by b(‖~θ‖22 +1− 2mini θi). And, the distance from
the prior pˆ = ~θ is measured by L(~p) = b‖~p− ~θ‖22, that is the
2-norm distance. The resulting prediction market is myopi-
cally truthful and leads to orders that can be priced using the
cost function:
C(~q) = min
t,~v≤t~e−~q
t− ~θT~v +
1
4b
~vT~v .
which requires solving a quadratic program. Also, the corre-
sponding scoring rule is strictly proper.
The above market is closely related to the market associated
with the quadratic scoring rule, since C(~q) reduces to the
popular quadratic cost function when the constraint ~v ≤
t~e − ~q is replaced with ~v = t~e − ~q. However, the slight
modification ensures that prices are non-negative, and has
an intuitive interpretation in terms of distance to the prior
belief.
Detailed proofs for the properties summarized in Table 1
are available in Appendix D.
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APPENDIX
A. PROPERTIES OF PRICING SCHEME
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Consider the KKT condition for (4).
~eT ~p = 1
pi = ∇u(~s)i
~pT~a+ y ≥ π
x · (~pT~a+ y − π) = 0
y ≥ 0
y · (ǫ− x) = 0
~ax+ ~q + ~s = z~e
(12)
1., 2. The first and second assertions follow from the
top two equations in (12), and the assumption that u(·) is
non-decreasing.
3. The consistency of price follows from constraints 3-6 in
(12).
4. Let (x1, z1, ~s1), (x2, z2, ~s2) be the optimal solution of (4)
for the case of ǫ = ǫ1 and ǫ2 respectively, where x¯ > ǫ2 > ǫ1.
Observe that from the problem formulation, x2 > x1. Since
u is concave, we know that
u(z2~e− ~q − x2~a)− u(z1~e− ~q − x1~a)
≤ ∇u(z1~e− ~q − x1~a)
T ((z2 − z1)e− (x2 − x1)~a)
u(z1~e− ~q − x1~a)− u(z2~e− ~q − x2~a)
≤ ∇u(z2~e− ~q − x2~a)
T ((z1 − z2)e− (x1 − x2)~a)
Therefore by adding the above inequalities, we get
(∇u(z1~e−~q−x1~a)−∇u(z2~e−~q−x2~a))
T ((z2−z1)e−(x2−x1)~a) ≥ 0
However, by the KKT conditions (refer (12)), we have
∇u(z1~e− ~q − x1~a)
T~e = 1,∇u(z2~e− ~q − x2~a)
T~e = 1
Also, x2 > x1. Therefore, we have
(∇u(z2~e− ~q − x2~a)−∇u(z1~e− ~q − x1~a))
T~a ≥ 0
which means ~pT (ǫ2)~a ≥ ~p
T (ǫ1)~a. This proves the claim.
5. To prove this claim, we use the following result from real
analysis: a bounded increasing or decreasing function on a
finite interval is integrable. Using the observation made in
part 4, the proof follows.
Remark A.1. For ease of presentation, in above proof
we assumed u to be differentiable. Otherwise, the proof still
holds with the gradients replaced by sub-gradients.
B. EQUIVALENCE OF THE MSR AND THE
SCPM
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
1. C(~q) is a convex function of ~q
Proof. To prove C(~q) is convex, it suffices to show
that for any ~q0 and ~q1, C(~q0 + λ~q1) is convex in λ. We
have the following:
dC
dλ
= ~q1 · ∇C|(~q0+λ~q1)
= ~q1 · p(~q0 + λ~q1)
Therefore, it suffices to show that ~q1 · ~p(~q0 + λ~q1) is in-
creasing in λ.
We will denote ~p(~q0 + λ~q1) by ~p(λ) and C(~q0 + λ~q1)
by C(λ). By the first condition of (1) and the proper-
ness of S , we have for any λ2 > λ1P
i pi(λ1)(~q0 + λ1~q1)i −C(λ1)
=
P
i pi(λ1)Si(p(λ1))−K
≥
P
i pi(λ2)Si(p(λ1))−K
≥
P
i pi(λ2)(~q0 + λ1~q1)i − C(λ1)
So, we are left with the following relation:P
i pi(λ1)(~q0 + λ1~q1)i ≥
P
i pi(λ2)(~q0 + λ1~q1)i
(13)
Similarly,P
i pi(λ2)(~q0 + λ2~q1)i ≥
P
i pi(λ1)(~q0 + λ2~q1)i
(14)
Then (13)-(14) yieldsP
i(λ2 − λ1)(pi(λ2)− pi(λ1))q1i ≥ 0
Thus, C(~q) is convex in ~q for every cost function corre-
sponding to a proper scoring rule.
2. For any vector ~q and scalar d:
C(~q + d~e) = d+C(~q) ∀d
Proof. We prove by contradiction. If there exists ~q
and d such that C(~q+d~e) > d+C(~q). Then we set q¯ =
~q+d~e. Then Si(~p)−Si(p¯) = (qi−q¯i)−(C(~q)−C(q¯)) > 0
for all i, which is impossible since there must be at
least one p′i > pi and Si is increasing function of pi.
Similarly, we can prove a contradiction for C(~q+ d~e) <
d+ C(~q).
Therefore, we have now proven both parts of Theorem
4.3.
C. CONVEXITY OF RISK MEASURE ρ(~Z)
• Convexity: Since ρ(Z) = mint{t− u(t~e+ ~Z)}, and u(·)
is concave. We know that ρ(Z) is convex.
• Monotonicity: The monotonicity also simply results
from the monotonicity of u(·). Given that ~Z  ~Z′ then
ρ(Z) = min
t
t− u(~Z + t~e) ≤ min
t
t− u( ~Z′ + t~e)
= ρ(Z′) ,
since the inequality is true for any fixed value of t.
• Translation equivariance: Finally, translation equivari-
ance can be simply demonstrated with a change of vari-
able t′ = t+ α :
ρ(Z + α) = mint t− u(~Z + (α+ t)~e)
= mint′ t
′ − α− u(~Z + t′)
= ρ(Z)− α
D. PROPERTIES OF VARIOUS SCPM MECH-
ANISMS
D.1 Properties of the LMSR
• Worst Case Loss: First, one can show that C(0) =
b logN from:
C(0) = mint t+ b log(
P
i(exp(−
t
b
)))
= b logN
Then, we can verify that B = 0.
B = maxi max~s −b log
“P
j exp(−
sj
b
)
”
− si
= maxi −b log(exp(−
s∗i
b
))− s∗i
= 0 .
• Risk Attitude: Below is the derivation for a more gen-
eral function u(~s) = −b log(
P
i θi exp(−si/b)):
L(~p)
= maxs
`
−b log
`P
i θi exp(
−si
b
)
´
−
P
i pisi
´
= bmax~v
`
− log
`P
i exp(vi)
´
−
P
i pi(log(θi)− vi)
´
= b
`
max~v
P
i pivi − log
`P
i exp(vi)
´´
− b
P
i pi log(θi)
= b
`P
i pi log(pi)−
P
i pi log(pˆi)
´
− b log(α)
= bLKL(~p || pˆ)− b log(α) ,
where we first used the replacement vi = −si/b+log(θi),
then solved analytically the maximization in terms of
~v (see [13], Example 3.25 for details), then again re-
placed α =
P
i θi and pˆ =
1
α
~θ. Thus, L(~p) is measured
in terms of Kullback-Leibler divergence LKL(~p ||
θ
α
).
~p = θ
α
minimizes L(~p), while the tolerance to risk is
measured by b. In the market that was popularized by
Hanson, ~θ = ~e, thus the market implicitly assumes a
uniform prior.
D.2 Properties of the Log-SCPM
• Worst Case Loss: The worst case loss is unbounded
since C(0) = (
P
i θi)(1−log
P
i θi) and B =∞. Specif-
ically,
C(0) = min
t
t−
X
i
θi log(t) = (
X
i
θi)(1− log
X
i
θi)
and
B = maximax~s
P
j θj log(sj)− si
≥ limα→∞ θ1 log(1) +
P
j 6=1 θj log(α)− 1
=∞ ,
where we restricted the optimization to s1 = 1 and
sj = α,∀j 6= 1 and assumed without loss of generality
that θj 6= 0 for some j 6= 1.
• Risk Attitude : The penalty function L(~p) can be de-
rived by simple algebra. Given that u(·) has the form
u(~s) =
P
i θi log(si), we can show that
L(~p) = max~s(
P
i θi log(si)− pisi)
=
P
i (θi log(θi/pi)− θi)
= −
P
i θi log(pi) +
P
i (θi log θi − θi)
= LLL(~p ;
~θ)) +K
where LLL(~p ;
~θ)) = − log(
Q
i p
θi
i ). As
P
i θi increases
the curvature of the negative log-likelihood function in-
creases. Thus, a higher
P
i θi leads to more risk toler-
ance.
D.3 Properties of the Min-SCPM
• Worst Case Loss : Necessarily, C(0) = mint t−mini ti =
0, while B = maxi max~s {minj sj − si} = 0. There-
fore, the worst case loss is 0.
• Risk Attitude : The penalty function can be derived as
follows:
L(~p) = max~s{mini si − ~p
T~s}
= max~s,v≤si∀i v − ~p
T~s
= max~s,v minλ v − ~p
T~s+ λT (~s− v~e)
= minλmax~s,v v − ~p
T~s+ λT (~s− v~e) = 0
D.4 Properties of the Quadratic Scoring Rule
• Worst Case Loss : When u(~s) = ~e
T~s
N
− 1
4b
~sTP~s with
P = (I − 1
N
~e~eT ), we first show that C(0) = 0 and then
that B = b(1− 1
N
) :
C(0) = mint t− u(t~e)
= mint t+
1
4b
t2~eTP~e− t = 0
and
B = maximax~s(u(~s)− si)
= u([−2b, 0, . . . , 0]) + 2b
= −2b
N
− b(1− 1
N
) + 2b
= b(1− 1
N
)
• Risk Attitude : Since the derivative of u(~s) = 1
N
~eT~s−
1
4b
~sTP~s is not non-decreasing, this version of the SCPM
does not have an equivalent representation in terms
of convex risk minimization. Specifically, when ~s =
(2b, 0, 0, ...0)
∇u1(~s) = −1 +
2
N
< 0
D.5 Properties of the Exponential-SCPM
• Cost function:
C(~q) = mint t− b(1−
1
N
P
i e
(−t+qi)/b)
Above is minimized at
1− 1
N
P
i e
(−t+qi)/b = 0
Therefore,
C(~q) = log(
P
i e
qi/b
N
)
• Worst Case Loss:
C(0) = 0
B = maximax~s b(1−
1
N
P
i e
−si/b)− si
= b logN
Therefore worst case loss is b logN .
• Risk Attitude: We simply resolve the definition of L(~p).
L(~p) = max~s u(~s)− ~p
T~s
= max~s b(1−
1
N
P
i e
−si/b)− ~pT~s
= b
P
i pi log (Npi)
= bLKL(~p||U)
• Properness: The function u(·) is smooth, and the gra-
dient ∇u(~s)i =
1
N
e−si/b. Clearly, the gradient spans
the simplex. Thus, the mechanism is strictly proper.
D.6 Properties of the Quad-SCPM
• Worst Case Loss: First one can show that C(0) = 0:
C(0) = mint
n
t−max~w≤t~e{~θ
T ~w − 1
4b
~wT ~w}
o
= mint, ~wmax~p≥0 t− ~θ
T ~w + 1
4b
~wT ~w − ~pT (t~e− ~w)
= max~p≥0mint, ~w t− ~θ
T ~w + 1
4b
~wT ~w − ~pT (t~e− ~w)
= max~p≥0&~eT ~p=1−b‖~θ − ~p‖
2
2 = 0
To compute B, we have
maximax~s u(~s)− si
= maxi max~s,~w≤~s ~θ
T ~w − 1
4b
~wT ~w − si
= maxi max~s,~w min~p≥0 ~θ
T ~w − 1
4b
~wT ~w − si + ~p
T (~s− ~w)
= maxi min~p≥0 max~s,~w ~θ
T ~w − 1
4b
~wT ~w − si + ~p
T (~s− ~w)
= maxi b
“
(θi − 1)
2 + ‖~θ‖22 − θ
2
i
”
= maxi b
“
−2θi + 1 + ‖~θ‖
2
2
”
= 2b
“
1
2
+ 1
2
‖~θ‖22 −mini θi
”
• Risk Attitude: We simply resolve the definition of L(~p).
L(~p) = max~s,~w≤~s ~θ
T ~w − 1
4b
~wT ~w − ~pT~s
= max~s,~wminλ≥0 ~θ
T ~w − 1
4b
~wT ~w − ~pT~s+ λT (~s− ~w)
= b‖~p− ~θ‖22
• Properness: The utility function u(~s) at a given ~s ≥
−b~e is given by:
maxv
1
N
~θT~v − 1
4b
~vT~v
s.t. ~v ≤ ~s
The partial derivative of this function with respect to
si is 0 at si ≥
2θib
N
, and θi
N
− si
2b
at si <
2θib
N
. Therefore,
gradient ∇u(~s)i = max{0,
θi
N
− si
2b
} which spans the
simplex and is continuous on the simplex. Thus, this
mechanism is strictly proper.
